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QBism, Quantum Nonlocality, and
the Objective Paradox
Gerold Gründler 1
Astrophysical Institute Neunhof, Nürnberg, Germany
The Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory claims to
eliminate the question of quantum nonlocality. This claim is not justified,
because the question of non-locality does not arise due to any interpre-
tation of quantum theory, but due to objective experimental facts. We
define the notion “objective paradox” and explain, comparing QBism and
the Copenhagen interpretation, how avoidance of any paradox results
into poor explanatory power of an interpretation, if there actually exists
an objective paradox.
1. Overview
Quantum Bayesianism[1,2], or for short QBism, is an interpretation
of quantum theory, which claims to “remove the paradoxes, conun-
dra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations
for the past nine decades” [2], and in particular “eliminates ‘quan-
tum nonlocality’.” [2] The latter claim is challenged in section 2 .
In section 3 the discussion is extended to a general consideration
regarding the (relatively poor) explanatory power of QBism. In
section 4 the notion “objective paradox” is defined. We point out,
how the anxious avoidance of any paradox — even an objective
paradox — causes QBism’s deficit of explanatory power.
1 email: gerold.gruendler@astrophys-neunhof.de
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2. Quantum Nonlocality
We consider the gedanken-experiment described by Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen [3] in the simplified variant proposed by Bohm [4]:
An instable system is prepared in a singlet state. It decays into two
fragments with spin = 1/2 each. At position xA, Alice measures
by means of a Stern-Gerlach magnet the spin of one of the frag-
ments along the z-axis. At position xB, Bob measures by means
of another Stern-Gerlach magnet the spin of the other fragment
along the z-axis. We assume that the measurements at xA and
xB are space-like separated, such that Alice and Bob can not get
any informations on the result of the other, before they have com-
pleted their own measurement. In the sequel we will discuss the
experiment in a reference frame, in which Alice has completed her
measurement, before Bob starts his measurement. This arbitrary
choice of reference system is of no relevance regarding the question
of nonlocality.
Based on their knowledge of the experimental setup, Alice and
Bob both describe the spin state of the singlet system, as long as
they have not yet made their measurements, by the state function√
1
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(
| ↓ 〉A ⊗ | ↑ 〉B + | ↑ 〉A ⊗ | ↓ 〉B
)
. (1)
Depending on the result ↑A or ↓A of her measurement, Alice
assigns a state function to her own fragment
↑A −→ | ↑ 〉A ↓A −→ | ↓ 〉A , (2a)
and — due to application of (1) — she assigns at the same time a
state function to Bob’s fragment:
↑A −→ | ↓ 〉B ↓A −→ | ↑ 〉B (2b)
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The state assignment (2b) to Bob’s fragment just matches Alice’s
conditional probabilistic assumptions
P ( ↑B | ↑A) = 0 P ( ↓B | ↑A) = 1
P ( ↑B | ↓A) = 1 P ( ↓B | ↓A) = 0 (3)
on Bob’s result, which again are based on her knowledge of the
fact that the primary system has been prepared in a singlet state.
To EPR [3], Alice’s state assignment (2b) to Bob’s fragment
seemed a severe problem. They argued: If Alice can predict the
outcome of Bob’s measurement with certainty (P = 1), then there
must exist an element of reality (something ‘out there’), which
causes Bob’s measurement result. But according to quantum theory,
only the overall singlet spin function (1) exists as long as neither
Alice nor Bob have started their measurements, while specific spin
states of the fragments do not yet exist. Only when the fragments
arrive at the Stern-Gerlach magnets — but not earlier! — , then
Nature decides for either ↑A and ↓B, or for ↓A and ↑B .
Alice and Bob can not use the correlation of their measurement
results for exchange of informations with superluminal speed. Thus
with regard to Alice and Bob, special relativity theory is not
violated. But Nature herself has the information on the spin
settings of the fragments available over space-like distance, with
no time delay at all, as proved by the perfect correlation of Alice’s
and Bob’s observations. One is tempted to say that Nature, when
setting the spins in the moment of measurement, seems to be
exempted from the restrictions of special relativity theory, and act
non-local.
How does the Copenhagen interpretation explain the correla-
tions? In his 1955 Gifford lecture [5] on “The Copenhagen Inter-
pretation of Quantum Theory”, Heisenberg explicates his interpre-
tation of the state function:
4
“The probability function combines objective and subjective
elements. It contains statements about possibilities or bet-
ter tendencies (‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy), and
these statements are completely objective, they do not de-
pend on any observer; and it contains statements about our
knowledge2 of the system, which of course are subjective in
so far as they may be different for different observers. [ . . . ]
we may say that the transition from the ‘possible’ to the
‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction of the object
with the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the
world3, has come into play; it is not connected with the act
of registration of the result by the mind of the observer.4
2 Heisenberg uses the term “knowledge” for the subjective element represented
by the state function. Timpson [6, sec. 2.3] emphasizes, that notions like
“knowledge” or “information” have an objective character, as they can be
objectively right or wrong. On the other hand, notions like “assumption” or
“believe” denote something truly subjective. We probably understand Heisen-
berg correctly if we assume that he wanted to characterize the subjective
element represented by the state function as “believe” of the physicist, but
not as “knowledge”, in contrast to the objective element represented by the
state function (i. e. the Aristotelian tendencies).
3 Heisenberg was well aware of the importance of decoherence for the measure-
ment process, long before Zeh and Zurek started to consider the issue in the
seventies. If in doubt, read Heisenberg’s 1955 article [5].
4 Note that Heisenberg here clearly addresses and removes the issue of
“Wigner’s friend”, many years before Wigner [7] invented the alleged problem.
QBism as well removes the issue, but in a basically different manner: In
Heisenberg’s point of view, the measurement result comes into being as soon
as the instrument (which according to the Copenhagen interpretation must
coercively be described by the methods and notions of classical physics) has
registered the result, i. e. already before the friend reads the result from the
display, and a fortiori before he communicates the result to Wigner. In the
QBism point of view, Wigner may describe the primary quantum object,
the instrument, and the friend as an entangled quantum system, and the
measurement result comes into being for Wigner only in the moment, when
he receives his friend’s report.
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The discontinuous change in the probability function, how-
ever, takes place with the act of registration, because it is
the discontinuous change of our knowledge in the instant of
registration that has its image in the discontinuous change
of the probability function.”
The Aristotelian tendencies are not hard facts, but anyway they
are something ‘out there’, not merely assumptions or believes of a
physicist. When Alice does her measurement, then “the transition
from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place”, and the Aristotelian
tendencies ‘out there’ are changed from (1) to (2). This of course
does mean, that Alice due to her measurement triggers an objective
change at Bob’s place, with no time retardation. The measurement
on the entangled system (1) clearly has a non-local character in
Heisenberg’s point of view.
Bohr, on the other hand, never made (to my best knowledge) any
onthological statement on the quantum-theoretical state function.5
5 The often quoted sentence “There is no quantum world. There is only an
abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task
of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say
about nature.”, reported by Petersen[8], is strongly misleading, if taken
out of context. In that article, Petersen explains: “Traditional philosophy
has accustomed us to regard language as something secondary and reality
as something primary. Bohr considered this attitude toward the relation
between language and reality inappropriate. When one said to him that
it must be reality which, so to speak, lies beneath language, and of which
language is a picture, he would reply, ‘We are suspended in language in
such a way that we cannot say what is up and what is down. The word
reality is also a word, a word which we must learn to use correctly.’ Bohr
was not puzzled by ontological problems or by questions as to how concepts
are related to reality. Such questions seemed sterile to him.”
Bohr always insisted that the quantum objects and the measuring devices
applied for their observation together constitute the individual quantum
pheonomena. Only in their entirety can quantum phenomena reasonably
be discussed by human beings. Bohr never answered with yes or no the
question, whether (only fantasized but not observed) quantum objects are
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He neither objected nor approved Heisenberg’s partial identification
of the state function with objective Aristotelian tendencies ‘out
there’ (the potentia of Aristotle’s philosophy); he simply — and
obviously very deliberately — was silent about this question. But
he always emphasized the wholeness of quantum phenomena. In
his reply [9] to EPR, Bohr spoke of phenomena “where we have to
do with a feature of individuality completely foreign to classical
physics.” He emphasized the word individuality by italics, and
he left no doubt that he meant this notion literally.6 Bohr was
convinced that the measuring instruments, which physicists apply
for the observation of a quantum object, must be considered an
integral, not separable part of the individual quantum phenomenon.
In the EPR-gedankenexperiment discussed above, the individual
quantum phenomenon extends from Alice’s Stern-Gerlach magnet
to Bob’s Stern-Gerlach magnet. When Alice does a measurement,
then the whole individual quantum phenomenon is affected. In
Bohr’s eyes, it would not be correct to say that Alice’s measurement
affects only her fragment. There only exists the one indivisible
system (1), onto which Alice’s instrument works, and only as an
effect of her completed measurement we can reasonably speak of
two new quantum systems (2), which have been created by Alice’s
measurement out of the primary quantum system (1).
Thus, while their wordings are different, Heisenberg and Bohr
agree on the non-local character of quantum phenomena, and
thereby offer an explanation for the EPR-correlations. This expla-
nation may not please everybody, but at least it is an explanation,
and it is a clear (affirmative) answer to the question of quantum
nonlocality.
“real” without the (classical) measurement instruments, which are needed for
their observation. Any answer to that question seemed pointless to Bohr,
and a misuse of language.
6 (latin) individual=not divisible
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To Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen, on the other hand, the as-
sumption of nonlocality seemed unacceptable. From the perfect
correlations, they concluded that the fragments actually must have
well-defined spin states ↑ or ↓ along the z-axis all the time, in-
dependent of any measurement. They deemed quantum theory
incomplete, i. e. they assumed that (1), while being correct, must
be completed by insertion of ‘hidden variables’, which reflect the
spin states of the fragments, and determine the results of Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements. We do not need to accept this explana-
tion, but at least it is an explanation, and it is a clear (negative)
answer to the question of quantum nonlocality.
QBism, however, works around the question of nonlocality due to
a quite strange and radical measure: This interpretation postulates
that the one and only purpose of quantum theory is to help an
agent to organize and optimize his/her personal believes regarding
his/her future experiences, which of course will happen at his/her
future place, but not somewhere else. Fuchs et. al. [2] explain:
“QBist quantum mechanics is local because its entire pur-
pose is to enable any single agent to organize her own
degrees of belief about the contents of her own personal
experience. No agent can move faster than light: the space-
time trajectory of any agent is necessarily timelike. [. . . ]
Quantum mechanics, in the QBist interpretation, cannot
assign correlations, spooky or otherwise, to space-like sepa-
rated events, since they cannot be experienced by any single
agent. Quantum mechanics is thus explicitly local in the
QBist interpretation. And that’s all there is to it.”
Now, EPR-correlations exist not only in gedanken-experiments.
They have been experimentally confirmed, see for example [10–12].
EPR raised a reasonable question, when they asked how Nature
brings about the perfect correlations, whether Nature really is
acting non-local over space-like distances, or whether there actually
8
exist hidden variables, or whether there is any further possible
explanation.
No interpretation of quantum theory is obliged to offer an expla-
nation for the experimentally confirmed correlations. It’s perfectly
fine, if “no comment!” is QBism’s only answer to the question of
nonlocality. But it is not sensible to say that with QBism “the issue
of nonlocality simply does not arise” [2]. It does arise, independent
of any interpretation of quantum theory, due to hard experimental
facts.
3. Explanatory Power
The QBist point of view, that Alice’s assignment of state functions
(2b) exists only for Alice at her place, but does not affect anything
at Bob’s place, does merely say what does not cause the perfect
correlation. When Alice is using quantum theory, to assign the
state function (2b) to Bob’s fragment, then she makes implicit use
of the non-local character of quantum theory. Of course she may
shrug shoulders and never ask what is behind the baffling power
of quantum theory, to supply her locally with believes regarding
the results of space-like distant measurements, which mysteriously
turn out true with no exception, and help her to win every bet.
Paraphrasing Caves, Fuchs, and Schack [13, sec. VI, par. 3–5], this
is the statement of QBism:
Doesn’t the perfect correlation demand an explanation in-
dependent of Alice’s belief?
Alice has put together all her experience, prior beliefs,
previous measurement outcomes, her knowledge of physics
and in particular quantum theory, all to predict the perfect
correlation of her results with Bob’s. Why would she want
any further explanation? What could be added to her belief
of certainty? She has consulted the world in every way she
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can to reach this belief; the world offers no further stamp of
approval for her belief beyond all the factors that she has
already considered.
These sentences are indicating a misunderstanding. Asking “Why
would she want any further explanation?”, Caves, Fuchs, and
Schack deny that QBism actually has deprived Alice of any ex-
planation for the perfect correlations. The belief of certainty, and
her unrestricted trust in the correctness and reliability of the ab-
stract mathematical machinery of quantum theory can not replace
anything which could rightly be named an “explanation”.
All reasonable interpretations of quantum theory (QBism no
doubt belongs to this group) are identical with regard to the
experimentally verifiable/falsifiable consequences which can be
derived from them. Thus reasonable interpretations differ not by
being right or wrong (they all are right), they merely differ in the
metaphysics, i. e. in the intelligible pictures (positivists would say
in the distracting illusions) they are offering to give us a framework
in which we can sort our experiences. The coherence of this
metaphysical framework then can give us the feeling to understand
the phenomena, which is much more than merely being able to
compute and correctly predict future measurement results, and
thereby sorting and optimizing one’s personal believes regarding
one’s future personal experiences.
Timpson [6, sec. 4.2] points out a general “explanatory deficit
problem” of QBism, and presents besides many other examples
the question, why some solids are good electrical conductors, while
others are insulators. Independent of any interpretation, we can
apply the mathematical machinery of quantum theory, and find out
whether the Fermi surface is within a partially filled conduction
band (then this solid is a conductor) or between and far-off two
conduction bands (then the solid is an insulator). If we follow
the QBism interpretation, then the mathematical result helps us
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to update our personal believes and informs us, which bets we
should accept, and which bets we better should reject, ‘and that’s
all there is to it.’ With other interpretations, which consider the
state function as representing something ‘out there’, we get a much
richer picture: We see electrons, which can (or can not) due to
an externally applied voltage and/or interactions with phonons be
excited into a free energy level, and then move almost unimpeded
through the solid.
No such pictures exist with QBism, because in that interpretation
the state function does not represent anything ‘out there’. This
deficit of plausible pictures of course does not affect the predictive
power with regard to future measurement results. Thus it is a
matter of taste, whether we, following Timpson [6], complain of
QBism’s lack of explanatory power, or whether we rather appreciate
that QBism spares us much of the metaphysical ballast of other
interpretations.
Note by the way that the question, whether some field like the ψ-
field of quantum theory should be reified and considered to represent
something ‘out there’, does not only turn up in the interpretation of
quantum theory. Consider for example Maxwell’s electromagnetic
field. Does it “exist”? It is created due to the dynamics of charged
particles, and the one and only method to observe it is due to the
observation of charged test particles. Thus the electromagnetic
field may rightly be considered to be nothing than an abstract
mathematical formalism, which helps us to organize our believes
regarding the question, how the dynamics of some charged particles
will impact the dynamics of some other charged particles. Still the
mental picture of an electromagnetic field really existing ‘out there’
is of such convincing explanatory power, and such a valuable help
to develop our intuition about electromagnetic interactions, that
many of us would strongly hesitate to give it up.
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E.T. Jaynes [14] once described the formalism of quantum theory
as “a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature,
in part incomplete human information about Nature — all
scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that
nobody has seen how to unscramble. Yet we think that
the unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further advance
in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot separate the
subjective and objective aspects of the formalism, we cannot
know what we are talking about”.
Caves, Fuchs, and Schack may rightly claim that they unscrambled
the egg, at least with regard to the interpretation of the state
function. They purged it from all objective content (Heisenberg’s
Aristotelian tendencies out there, Bohr’s objective individuality of
quantum phenomena), and kept nothing but the subjective believes
of an agent. But this success comes at a high price: At the same
time, they skipped a large part of the explanatory metaphysical
power of the Copenhagen interpretation, without replacing it by
anything better.
What is so bad with the inseparable mixture of objective facts and
subjective believes in quantum theory? We acquired our cognitive
capabilities during millions of years of evolution. Hence it is no
surprise that these capabilities don’t fit to a type of phenomena (i. e.
quantum phenomena) which human beings first time encountered
in the twentieth century. The ‘paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-
problems’ turning up in the discussion of quantum phenomena are
not caused by any interpretation of quantum theory. Instead they
are caused by the mismatch between objective facts ‘out there’ and
our human type of cognition, which is not prepared to cope with
quantum phenomena.
We have a theory, which perfectly matches our cognitive capabil-
ities: Classical physics. A fictitious theory, which would perfectly
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match the objective world ‘out there’ would be completely useless,
because no human being would be able to understand it. Quantum
theory can only be useful, if it spans the gap between the objective
world and our cognitive capabilities. To meet this demand, quan-
tum theory must necessarily combine elements of objective aspects
of the world, and elements of the human type of thinking, like a
bridge over a river must have bridge heads on both banks to serve
it’s purpose. Like no part of the bridge can be assigned to the left
or to the right bank of the river, but each part is necessarily tied to
both banks, the parts of quantum theory can not be separated into
elements which belong to the objective world, and other elements
which belong to the human observer. Instead quantum theory can
only meet it’s purpose, if each of it’s parts is reflecting both the
objective reality ‘out there’ and the cognitive capabilities and the
type of thinking of the human observer. The inseparability of the
subjective and objective aspects of the formalism is not a problem,
but a necessary feature of quantum theory.
Once we had the mathematical machinery of quantum theory,
found by ingenious guessing, we next needed some interpretation,
because we felt that a perfectly working mathematical machinery
is not sufficient, to give us the feeling of true understanding. Bohr
and Heisenberg did an excellent job, when they worked out the
Copenhagen interpretation [5], to reconcile the objective world ‘out
there’ with the cognitive capabilities of human brains. Good ideas
for further improvement are welcome. QBism, however, simply
amputated the objective part from the interpretation of the state
function (while keeping with no modification the full mathematical
machinery with it’s ‘scrambled objective and subjective elements’),
and left us with a torso of marginal explanatory power, a bridge
with only one head on one bank.
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4. Accepting/denying an objective paradox
In the well-known experiment of Tonomura et. al. [15], single elec-
trons go one by one through the biprism with two openings, and
still the observation points of the electrons in the detector plane
add up after many experimental runs to an interference pattern.
The state function, which quantum theory assigns to each single
electron, evolves through both openings of the biprism. If the
state function is interpreted as representing something objectively
existing out there and really moving through both openings of the
biprism in each single run of the experiment, then we get a mental
picture which offers an explanation for the interference pattern.
According to the Copenhagen interpretation, the electron may
indeed be imagined as a wave moving through both openings. But
at the same time the Copenhagen interpretation reminds us that
the validity of the wave picture is limited by the complementary
picture of a particle, and that it depends on our choice of the
particular experimental arrangement, whether the wave-like or the
particle-like character of the electron is elicited. Actually in the
experiment of Tonomura et. al., the electron is elicited as a wave
while moving through the biprism, but as a particle when being
observed in the detector plane. We thus arrive in case of this
experiment not at a consistent classical picture of wave or particle,
but at the complementary picture of wave and particle.
If we could have nice classical pictures, then hardly anybody
would reject them. But if we can only have such strange and
paradoxical complementary pictures, then some of us prefer to skip
those dubious “explanations” completely, and constrain to well-
behaved Bayesian probabilities. While others think that strange
explanations at least are better than no explanations. Its a matter
of taste. Its really nothing but a matter of taste, as either inter-
pretation leads to identical experimentally testable consequences,
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and to identical expectation values for future measurements.
QBism claims “that it removes the paradoxes [ . . . ] that have
plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades.” [2] The
greek word paradox means, that something is incompatible with
the human way of thinking. Is it really an advantage, if an inter-
pretation of quantum theory can avoid any paradox? It may not
be an advantage, if there really should be an objective mismatch
inbetween the reality of quantum phenomena and the cognitive
capabilities of human beings, caused by the fact that quantum phe-
nomena were irrelevant during the many millions of years of human
evolution. Such mismatch could be named an “objective paradox”,
which can not be removed, because we can change the contents of
our thinking, but we can not change our way of thinking. If such
objective paradox really exists, shouldn’t then an interpretation
of quantum theory better acknowledge it, appropriately reflect it,
and somehow arrange with it, instead of trying to shift it aside?
“The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory starts from
a paradox.” is the first sentence of Heisenberg’s article [5]. And
some pages later he explains:
“There is no use in discussing what could be done if we
were other beings than we are. At this point we have to
realize, as von Weizsäcker has put it, that ‘Nature is earlier
than man, but man is earlier than natural science’. The first
part of the sentence justifies classical physics, with its ideal
of complete objectivity. The second part tells us why we
cannot escape the paradox of quantum theory, namely, the
necessity of using the classical concepts.”
The Copenhagen interpretation acknowledges the existence of an
objective paradox, and reflects it by the introduction of comple-
mentary explanatory pictures. QBism, on the other hand, targets —
and indeed accomplishes! — an interpretation which is completely
free of paradoxa. For this purpose it reduces the interpretation of
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the state function to representing the subjective assumptions of
an agent, but not anything objectively existing ‘out there’. As an
inevitable trade-off, the denial of the objective paradox thereby
deprives QBism of almost all explanatory power.
The nonlocality of Nature, encoded in the objective individu-
ality of quantum phenomena in Bohr’s wording, or in objective
Aristotelian tendencies in Heisenberg’s wording, may seem quite
strange to many of us. Indeed, these ideas really are very strange, if
considered in human brains, whose cognitive capabilities have been
shaped by millions of years of interaction with an environment,
which can appropriately be described in terms of classical physics.7
But is the wordless shrug of shoulders offered by QBism really
better? Well, that’s a matter of taste.
7 How could Aristotle conceive the objective tendencies, even though he never
observed a quantum phenomenon? Isn’t this an indication, that the objective
tendencies actually are not something ‘out there’, but a subjective element of
human cognition? Probably the best answer to this question is to note, that
the request for a separation of objective and subjective elements is essentially
nonsense, both with regard to the mathematical formalism and with regard
to the interpretation of physical theories.
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